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ABSTRACT: Current design codes like the Eurocode use safety or reliability classes to assign target reli-
abilities to different types of structures or structural members according to the potential consequences of 
failure. That, in essence, is a risk-based criterion. A wide range of structures is designed with such 
codes, and distinction is made between reliability classes. These reliability classes are not necessarily 
well suited for flood defense systems, neither are the design rules and partial safety factors, which are 
calibrated for a wide range of standard applications. For a flood defense system protecting a large area 
from flooding, on the other hand, it is worthwhile to base the design and safety assessment standards on a 
risk assessment - a tailor-made solution. The investments can be considerable and the stakes are high, es-
pecially for low-lying delta areas, where the consequences of flooding can be devastating. In order to an-
swer the question “How safe is safe enough?” a framework for acceptable risk is required. Subsequently, 
from acceptable risk we can deduce target reliabilities for the protection system as a whole as well as for 
its elements. For practical application, these target reliabilities can then be translated into design and as-
sessment rules; for example, using LRFD (load and resistance factor design) to derive partial safety fac-
tors. 
This paper describes how to define safety standards for flood defenses, in particular dikes, step-by-
step. An important aspect in translating high-level requirements into specific (low-level) design rules that 
apply to specific failure modes for specific flood protection elements is the so-called “length-effect”. This 
is especially relevant for long-linear structures like dikes, where usually the length is much larger than the 
scale of fluctuation of dominant load or resistance properties. The longer the structure, the higher the 
chance to encounter either and extreme load or a weak spot (i.e., low resistance) – hence the word 
“length-effect”. The effect is that the probability of failure increases with the length of the dike. The im-
plication for design and assessment rules is that the reliability requirements to a cross section (“zero 
length”) need to be stricter (i.e., higher target reliability) than for the whole reach. 
This paper attempts to demonstrate how tailor-made safety standards for large scale flood defense sys-
tems can be derived in a risk-based fashion. Since flood defenses differ from smaller scale geotechnical 
structures in many aspects and given the volume of investments in such large-scale engineering systems, 
it is very attractive to deviate from the standard design codes. That is not deviating conceptually, but 
rather   deriving safety factors for the specific application to better account for the characteristics and un-
certainties involved. The authors strive to show that safety levels and partial safety factors in the pre-
sented approach are far from arbitrary. They are part of an overall consistent flood risk framework, a 
framework that provides a link between geotechnical engineers and other disciplines involved in provid-
ing safety from flooding.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Current design codes like Eurocode use safety or reliability classes to assign target reliabilities to differ-
ent types of structures or structural members according to the potential consequences of failure. That, in 
essence, is a risk-based criterion. Also the design life plays a role in assigning target reliabilities. Due to 
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the wide range of structures design with such codes, a differentiation with, for example, three reliability 
classes makes sense. Because it is not (yet) realistic to design each structure using risk-assessment tech-
niques. For a flood defense system protecting a large area from flooding, on the other hand, it is worth-
while to base the design and safety assessment standards on a risk assessment. The investments can be 
considerable and the stakes are high, especially for low-lying delta areas, where the consequences of 
flooding can be devastating. Therefore, tailor-made solutions become much more attractive.  
The basic underlying question is “How safe is safe enough?”. In order to answer that question a frame-
work for acceptable risk is required. Having established acceptable risk we can deduce a target reliabil-
ities for the protection system as well as for its elements. For practical application, these target reliabil-
ities can then be translated into design and assessment rules; for example, using LRFD (load and 
resistance factor design) to derive partial safety factors.  
This paper describes how to define safety standards for flood defenses, in particular dikes, step-by-
step. The first step is to define what is socially acceptable. To this end, often is relied on fatality risk cri-
teria, the risk of individuals of dying due to flooding or the number of expected fatalities. Next, economic 
considerations play a role, in which the cost of flood protection is weighed against the risk-reduction 
achieved by improved protection. These criteria allow decision makers to decide on protection standards 
in form of target reliabilities. 
Such target reliabilities are high-level requirements in a sense that they are expressed in terms of the 
acceptable probability of failure of the flood protection (sub)system under consideration. In order to en-
sure the protection level of the (sub)system its elements need to be designed with higher target reliabil-
ities. That is because typically flood defenses are linear defenses, in which failure of any element leads to 
system failure; a dike breach anywhere leads to flooding. From a system reliability point of view, flood 
defense system are serial systems where the probability of failure is dominated by the weakest links. In 
fact, the same holds for the different failure mechanisms; any mechanism may cause failure of an element 
(e.g., dike section). 
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Figure 1. Schematic Overview of a Flood Defense System and its Elements 
An important aspect in translating high-level requirements into specific (low-level) design rules that ap-
ply to specific failure modes for specific flood protection elements is the so-called “length-effect”. This is 
especially relevant for long-linear structures like dikes, where usually the length is much larger than the 
scale of fluctuation of dominant load or resistance properties. The longer the structure, the higher the 
chance to encounter either and extreme load or a weak spot (i.e., low resistance) – hence the word 
“length-effect”. The effect is that the probability of failure increases with the length of the dike. The im-
plication for design and assessment rules is that the reliability requirements to a cross section (“zero 
length”) need to be stricter (i.e., higher target reliability) than for the whole reach. 
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The organization of this paper follows the top-down structure as described above, from high-level to low 
level requirements. Section 2 addresses the acceptable risk criteria, followed by an inventory of the fail-
ure mechanisms considered in dike design in section 3, enriched by failure observations from New Or-
leans with Hurricane Katrina (2005). The length-effect is discussed and illustrated in section 4. Section 5 
describes the steps from acceptable risk to design rules and partial safety factors. The paper finishes with 
a discussion in section 6. 
2 ACCEPTABLE FLOOD RISK 
2.1 Acceptable Risk Framework 
Protection of individuals and groups against natural and man-made hazards is a task of human civiliza-
tions. Historically, most protection efforts were realized after major disasters, the consequences still being 
very much present in the collective memory. Modern risk-based approaches aim to enable preventive pro-
tection by identifying risks, before they manifest themselves as disasters. Risk is defined as the probabil-
ity of an (unwanted) event times the consequences involved. Expressing them (amongst others) in mone-
tary terms and fatalities is a means to enable weighing investments in prevention against the benefits of 
risk reduction.  
The estimation of the consequences of flooding is a central element in flood risk analysis and man-
agement. The totality of flood damage comprises casualties, material and economic damage as well as the 
loss of or harm to immaterial values like works of art and amenity. However, for practical reasons the no-
tion of risk in a societal context is often reduced to the total number of casualties using a definition as: 
"the relation between frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a 
given population from the realization of specified hazards". If the specified level of harm is limited to loss 
of life, the societal risk may be modeled by the frequency of exceedance curve of the number of deaths, 
also called the FN-curve (see 2.3).  
The consequence part of a risk can also be limited to the material damage expressed in monetary 
terms. It should be noted however, that the reduction of the consequences either measure may not ade-
quately model the public's perception of the potential loss. The simplification clarifies the reasoning at the 
cost of accuracy. Nevertheless, for practical tractability, three criteria are defined and used in the follow-
ing: 
1 individual risk 
2 group risk 
3 economical risk 
 
The first two are belong to the category of “loss of life” criteria, which are often considered as boundary 
conditions providing minimum protection level. While individual risk refers to the probability of dying of 
an individual person in a specific location, group risk refers to large numbers of fatalities in one event. 
Economical risk refers to the direct and indirect economical consequences of a disaster, allowing for a di-
rect comparison of investments in and effects of prevention in monetary terms. Both, group risk and eco-
nomical risk are considered societal risk criteria, because they are usually applied (i.e., aggregated) on a 
national scale. 
2.2 Individual Risk 
Individual risk is defined as the probability of an individual residing in a given area to die as a conse-
quence of flooding. This probability includes the nature of the hazard (i.e., probabilities of discharge, wa-
ter level, wind, waves etc.), the effectiveness of the flood protection system (e.g., probability of a dike 
breach) and the conditional flood characteristics (e.g., water depth, flow velocity). Jonkman (2007) dis-
cusses loss of life related to flooding extensively. Individual risk is typically represented in risk maps; an 
example is given in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Individual Risk Central Holland, probability of dying to flooding [1/yr] (Jonkman, 2007) 
Individual risk 
(probability [1/yr]) 
Being able to determine individual risks with flood risk analysis, the question remains what is acceptable. 
The same question plays a role for many other hazards, especially in external safety (e.g., transport and 
storage of hazardous goods, chemical plants etc. An indicative figure for acceptable individual risk used 
in many applications is 10-6 per year (e.g. Lerche et. al, 2006). 
One method to determine such acceptance limits to using revealed preferences (Vrijling et. al, 1993). 
That is done by analyzing accident statistics and differentiating between the activities during which per-
sons lost their lives. The fact, that the actual personal risk levels connected to various activities show sta-
tistical stability over the years and are approximately equal for the Western countries, indicates a consis-
tent pattern of preferences. The probability of losing one's life in normal daily activities such as driving a 
car or working in a factory appears to be one or two orders of magnitude lower than the overall probabil-
ity of dying. Only a purely voluntary activity such as mountaineering entails a higher risk (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Personal risks in Western countries, deduced from the statistics of causes of death and the number of participants per 
activity (Vrijling et. al, 1993) 
Apart from a slightly decreasing trend of the death risks presented, probably due to technical progress, it 
seems appropriate to use revealed preferences as a basis for decisions with regard to the personally ac-
ceptable probability of an accident (failure) Pfi in the following way: 
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where Pd|fi denotes the probability of being killed in the event of an accident. In this expression the policy 
factor i varies with the degree of voluntariness with which an activity i is undertaken and with the bene-
fit perceived. It ranges from 100 in the case of complete freedom of choice like mountaineering to 0.01 in 
case of an imposed risk without any perceived direct benefit (such a large range was already noted in 
1969 by Starr). The latter is also applied as individual risk criterion for hazardous installation nears hous-
ing areas without any direct benefit to the inhabitants. A proposal for the choice of the value of the policy 
factor i as a function of voluntariness and benefit is given in the table below. For the flood defenses a i-
value of 1.0 to 0.1 seems appropriate. 
 
Table 1. The value of the policy factor i as a function of voluntariness and benefit (Vrijling et. al, 1993) 
policy factor  i voluntariness direct benefit example 
100 voluntary direct benefit mountaineering 
10 voluntary direct benefit motor biking 
1.0 neutral direct benefit car driving 
0.1 involuntary some benefit factory 
0.01 involuntary no benefit LPG-station 
2.3 Group Risk 
Another perspective on loss of life besides individual risk is the total number of people that would drown 
in one flood event. Considering impact on society, single events with large numbers of fatalities (e.g., a 
place crash with 200 casualties) are less acceptable than large numbers of accidents with small number of 
fatalities (e.g., 100 car accidents with 2 casualties each). Thus, with group risk the so called risk-
averseness (Bernoulli, 1783) enters the assessment. 
Since a flood-protected area can inundate due to breaches at various locations and in different scenar-
ios, an FN-curve is an appropriate way to represent this type of risk. As an example the FN-curve of the 
Brielse polder area in the Netherlands is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. FN-curve for Flooding of the Brielse Polder (NL) 
An FN-curve plots the number of expected fatalities per flood scenario over its corresponding occurrence 
probability. The FN-curve is the description of the current situation or a future scenario and, as for the in-
dividual risk, an acceptance criterion is needed. Jonkman (2007) discusses such criteria in detail. 
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2.4 Economic Optimization 
While the loss of life-related acceptance criteria discussed above aim to define minimum safety criteria, 
from an economic point of view an optimal protection standard can be found by balancing the cost of pro-
tection against the benefit of risk reduction. In other words, the economically optimal probability of fail-
ure Pf,opt is the one, for which the (marginal) investment I in a safer flood defense system is equals the 
(marginal) benefit by the decreasing present value of the risk. 
, ,min min f opt f opt(Q)  =  (I( ) + PV(  D))P P  (2) 
where Q is the total cost, PV the present value operator and D the total damage in case of flood defense 
failure and subsequent flooding.  
If (despite ethical objections) the value of a human life is rated at d, the amount of damage is increased 
by d| f p , where Np = number of casualties. A typical value chosen for d is the present value of the 
net national product per inhabitant. The advantage of taking the possible loss of lives into account in eco-
nomic terms is that the safety measures are affordable in the context of the national income (see also Vri-
jling and Van Gelder, 2000). 
  d NP
Omitting the value of human life, the decision problem as formulated by the Delta Committee (van 
Dantzig, 1953) is given below. The investment I(h) in the protective dike system is given as a function of 
the crest level h by:  
0 1 0( ) ( )I h I I h h    (3) 
where I0 is the initial cost (i.e., mobilization), I1 is the marginal cost of raising the dike and h0 is the cur-
rent dike crest level. The probability of exceedance of the crest level of the dike is approximated by a 
shifted exponential distribution: 
1 ( )
h A
BF h e
   (4) 
where in this example the location parameter is A=1.96m and the scale parameter B=0.33m. The risk of 
inundation in this simplified example is equal to the probability of exceedance of the dike crest times the 
damage D in case of inundation. 
( )h A
BRisk e D
   (5) 
Because the risk is present every year the present value of the risk over an infinite period has is given by 
its present value. 
( )
( )
h A
B DPV Risk e
r
 ฀  (6) 
where r is the rate of interest. The total cost is the sum of the investment and the present value of the re-
maining risk that is accepted. 
( )
0 1 0( ) ( )
h A
B DQ h I I h h e
r
     (7) 
Differentiating the total cost with respect to the decision variable h and equating the derivative to 0 gives 
a rather elegant result. 
( )
1
( ) 1 0
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BQ h DI e
h B r
    ฀  (8) 
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The last expression shows that the acceptable probability increases with the marginal cost of dike con-
struction, with the standard deviation of the storm surge level B and the rate of interest. It decreases with 
the damage that will occur in case of an inundation. 
The Delta Committee (van Dantzig, 1953) calculated an economically optimal probability of inunda-
tion for Central Holland in 1960 to be 8 10-6 per year (Figure 5). 
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Some approximate calculations performed by Dutch engineers in 2006 indicated a level of 10-3 per year 
for New Orleans. The city was protected against a hurricane category 3 with a return period of 30 to 100 
years. The present system that was resurrected after Katrina has the same safety level. 
 
 
Figure 5. Example Economic Optimization: Optimal Crest Level 
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The economic criterion presented above should be adopted as a basis for the "technical" input to the po-
litical decision process. All information of the risk assessment should be available in the political process. 
It is emphasized that the decision remains a political one. 
Another important remark is that in the historical approach the crest height of the dike was the main 
resistance parameter, as illustrated here for sake of illustration. Nowadays, such analyses are carried out, 
analyzing the cost to reach a certain protection level in terms of probability of failure; thus, including all 
kinds of failure mechanisms in addition to overtopping. The most dominant mechanisms being of geo-
technical nature such as instability of the inner slope or piping. 
2.5 Summary 
For large engineering systems like flood defense systems it is worthwhile to determine taylor-made safety 
standards instead of relying on rather coarse consequence and reliability classes as in the Eurocode or 
other design codes. In order to establish appropriate target reliabilities, one needs to assess what risk is 
acceptable. A practical approach to this problem is to look at loss-of-life risk criteria on the one hand and 
at economical criteria on the other. For loss of life risks, individual risk is typically distinguished from 
group risk. Both give indications of desirable minimum protection standards. Economically optimal pro-
tection, on the contrary, seeks to balance investments and benefits in terms of reduced flood risk monetiz-
ing the damage. In principle, the most stringent criterion is to be applied. In other words, the highest tar-
get reliability derived from the three criteria should be adopted as target reliability of the flood protection 
system from a technical point of view. 
The following two sections will deal with the failure mechanisms to be taken into account in designing 
flood defenses and how the target reliability on system level can be translated into practicable design 
rules for dikes. 
3 FAILURE MODES AND LESSONS FROM NEW ORLEANS 
While dikes in the field seem straight-forward engineered structures, their behavior can be complicated. 
This section deals with the physical behavior of flood defenses, especially in terms of failure mecha-
nisms. The geotechnical aspects are very important due to the typically large uncertainties in ground con-
ditions.  Both theory and practical observations are discussed. 
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3.1 Failure modes of flood defense systems 
Probabilistic design and safety assessment methods have raised the awareness, that the probability of ex-
ceedance of the design water level (or the reciprocal: the return period) is not an accurate predictor of the 
probability of flooding. Traditionally, the crest height is determined by such design water levels and the 
dike is designed according to design rules. However, other mechanisms, and certainly geotechnical ones 
like slope failure of piping can result in sudden failure and are poorly accounted for in design frequency 
approaches. More failure mechanisms than overtopping need to be accounted for, if the reliability target 
refers to the probability of flooding rather than the probability of a certain load condition (see Figure 6).  
As a single dike is only one element, the flood defense whole system should be considered (see Figure 1), 
which is only as strong as its weakest link; hence, the importance of the geotechnical mechanisms and the 
subsoil conditions. 
 
 
Figure 6. List of most important failure modes of dikes (TAW, 1998) 
A similar list of failure mechanisms can be made for dunes and hydraulic structures, where other failure 
mechanisms should be added to the list, for instance structural failure of sluice doors or the failure to 
close movable elements. 
3.2 Relative contribution of the failure mechanisms 
The relative contribution of the different failure mechanism to the probability of system failure depends 
on different factors: 
 The nature of the load: River dikes are generally more vulnerable for overflow, whereas sea 
dike are more vulnerable for overtopping. Piping and stability are time-dependent mechanisms 
that are more susceptible for long lasting high waters (on rivers).  
 The local geology: Areas with a high occurrence of sand layers are more vulnerable for piping 
than areas consisting of mainly clays. Weak top layers increase the probability of sliding fail-
ure. 
 The safety level: System designed for events with high safety standards tend to involve high 
crest levels. While the probability of overtopping may be low, the large potential head differ-
ence increases the vulnerability with respect to geotechnical mechanisms like piping.  
 
In terms of observed failures, overtopping used to be dominant in the Netherlands in the past, together 
with ice-dams. Nowadays, strength related mechanisms are getting more attention and flood defense are 
explicitly assessed for these mechanisms. Besides, the warming of river due to excess heat from factories 
and power plants has minimized the risk of ice-dams. 
3.3 Experiences from New Orleans 
Hurricane Katrina caused one of the most catastrophic floods in recent history destroying large parts of 
the Mexican Gulf and New Orleans in August 2005. Many valuable lessons can be learned from the event 
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regarding flood defenses. The large amount of breaches exhibited most of the well-known failure mecha-
nism. For a more elaborate description of the breaches it is referred to Kanning et. al (2007). An overview 
of the breach locations is shown in Figure 7. Generally, the breaches can be distinguished in three groups. 
The first group (I) is on the east side of the city where the load on the system was much higher than the 
design resistance. The second group (II) of failure is around the navigation channels where overtopped 
flood walls failed. The third group of failure (III) occurred around dewatering channels where geotechni-
cal failure caused the centre part of the city to flood. A few interesting breaches are discussed below. 
 
 
Figure 7. Overview failures in New Orleans 
Figure 8 shows the failure of an earthen dike due to overtopping and overflow (area I). The water level in 
the whole area was much higher than the dikes. The unprotected dike eroded away for over many kilome-
ters. Figure 9 show the geotechnical failure of a levee due to sliding in area III. The water level was be-
low the crest of the floodwall and below design conditions. The subsoil slid horizontally over a weak 
layer, causing a large breach. Figure 10 shows the failure due to piping of a flood wall, again below the 
crest and below design conditions. For more information is referred to Kanning et. al (2008). Both fail-
ures (both in area III) emphasize the importance of geotechnical sound designs.  
Figure 11 shows the failure at transition between a wall and an earthen dike in area II. Both adjacent 
dike and floodwall survived, only the transition failed. The vulnerability of transition could be observed 
all over New Orleans. Even small objects as staircases caused increased erosion of the dikes. 
 
 
Figure 8. Overtopped levee in New Orleans  
(source: ILIT, 2006) 
 
Figure 9. Stability failure in New Orleans due to hurricane 
Katrina (modified after ILIT, 2006) 
protected side 
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Figure 10. Piping failure in New Orleans 
 
Figure 11. Failure between gate structure and dike 
protected side 
 
Perhaps more important than the individual failures was the system behavior. Or as stated by IPET 
(2006): “The System did not perform as a system: the hurricane protection in New Orleans and Southeast 
Louisiana was a system in name only.” For many different reasons (e.g. funding structures, lack of fund-
ing etc.) the flood defense system could be regarded as a patchwork of defenses without clear coherence. 
Examples are missing levee parts, many different levee heights and abrupt changes in heights, the use of 
different reference datum. All these elements contributed to the total system performance. An interesting 
additional observation on system level is that most infrastructures (roads, pump pipes) penetrate the de-
fense system (with gates to maintain the flood defense function). In contrast, in the Netherlands for ex-
ample, infrastructure goes over the dike to reduce the amount of potential vulnerable spots. 
3.4 Summary 
System reliability considerations as well as observations during flood events like Katrina show that dike 
safety is much more than avoiding overtopping. Other failure mechanisms need to be considered, too. 
Geotechnical failure mechanisms play a crucial role and can dominate the probability of failure due to the 
large uncertainties associated with ground conditions. Hence, they need to be properly addressed in de-
sign and assessment rules of flood defenses. 
4 SPATIAL VARIABILITY AND LENGTH EFFECT 
4.1 What is the Length-Effect? 
Section 2 on acceptable risk has provided a framework to derive an acceptable probability of system fail-
ure – the target reliability for the system as a whole. Section 3 has discussed the different mechanisms 
contributing to the probability of system failure. However, the different failure mechanisms are usually 
assessed at so-called representative cross sections, dike profiles of zero length. As mentioned, the so-
called length-effect should not be neglected in deriving safety targets for dike cross sections. It is defined 
as the increase of the probability of failure with the increasing length of a dike reach. The two main fac-
tors determining the magnitude of the length effect are: 
- The relative contribution of load and resistance: A high contribution of the resistance to the 
total variance increases the length effect. This is because for flood defenses, load parameters 
(e.g., river water level) tend to have much larger scales of fluctuation than resistance parame-
ters (e.g. soil properties) do. 
- The spatial variability in the subsoil: the higher the spatial variability in the subsoil (e.g., 
shorter auto-correlation distances of ground properties), the higher the length effect. 
4.2 Load vs. Resistance Uncertainty 
Usually the probability of failure of a flood defense system is determined by evaluating the following 
limit station function: 
i i iZ R S   (10) 
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Where Ri is the resistance vector consisting of all relevant dike sections and failure mechanisms con-
tained in index i and Si is the load vector. Loads usually exhibit large correlation distances (e.g. water 
levels in rivers). For load-dominated failure mechanisms (e.g. overflow), the probability of failure of a 
dike reach is close to the probability of failure for a cross section. On the other hand, resistance-
dominated mechanisms exhibit significant length-effect, up to a ratio of 100 between the probability for a 
dike reach and the probability for a cross section. The breaches New Orleans (see section 2) underpin that 
large variability in ground conditions and resistance properties make the existence of weak spots likely. 
4.3 Heterogeneity in Ground Conditions 
The high resistance uncertainty of flood defenses is mainly caused by the high uncertainty in the subsoil 
caused by a high spatial variability (heterogeneity) in the subsoil combined with the limited availability 
of direct measurements. The spatial variability (of heterogeneity) can be subdivided into two classes (see 
Figure 12): 
1. Continuous variability which is associated with continuous fluctuation of properties like layer 
thickness, hydraulic conductivity or shear strength.  
2. Discrete elements like old river beds that are filled with less resistant or highly permeable mate-
rials. When undetected, these “anomalies” can represent weak spots. 
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Figure 12. Continuous and discrete variability 
4.4 Modeling Heterogeneity 
Continuous variability can be modeled using random field theory (see e.g. Vanmarcke, 1977). Using this 
theory, the soil properties are modeled with mean, variance and autocorrelation function. The autocorrela-
tion function describes how the correlation of a property between different locations decays with increas-
ing lag (distance between two points). Vrouwenvelder (2006) uses the following auto-correlation func-
tion: 
2
2( ) (1 )
x
d
x xx  
    e  (11)  
where ρ(Δx) is the correlation between two point separated with distance Δx, ρx is the lag-independent 
correlation and d is the correlation distance of a parameter (see e.g. Vanmarcke, 1977) 
Discrete variability is usually modeled using scenarios, see (Schweckendiek & Calle, 2010). Regional 
geological knowledge and experience can be used to determine (prior) probabilities of weak spots. 
4.5 Mathematical Treatment of the Length-Effect 
Vanmarcke (1977) and Vrouwenvelder (2006) use the outcrossing approach to determine the probability 
of exceedance of a threshold (here: the limit state Z=0) of length L using the mathematical properties of 
the autocorrelation function. Assuming full spatial correlation of the loads, for a single resistance variable 
R, this yields: 
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  (12) 
Where Pf,system  is the probability of system failure, βsection is the reliability index of a cross section, αR is 
the importance factor of the resistance R, L is the considered length and d is again the scale of fluctuation 
Note that a low αR corresponds to a low length effect, as mentioned in section 4.2 
 
For a multi-dimensional problem (several resistance and/or load parameters), the length effect can be in-
corporated by using the equivalent mechanism length leq (see Calle, 2010): 
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Where the subscript i refers to the different basic random variables. Finally the length effect factor for a 
mechanism, nmech is given by: 
,
,section
f system
mech
f
P
n
P
  (16) 
The influence of the probability of weak spots (discrete elements) can be incorporated by using condi-
tional probability (Schweckendiek & Calle, 2010):  
| ,section if weak spot failure weak spot fp p p p     (17) 
 
The different failure probabilities of different dike reaches cannot just be summed as they are correlated. 
For more information about combining correlated dike sections is referred to Vrouwenvelder (2006). It 
must be noted that these theories are an extension of a two dimensional analysis into the third dimension. 
Efforts are being done to extend these theories towards full heterogeneous and three dimensional models 
(e.g. Fenton & Griffiths, 2003 and Hicks, 2005). 
4.6 Example: Piping 
In this example we consider the failure mechanism piping. In Figure 13 the length-effect factor nmech is 
plotted over the length L of the dike part of the flood defense system. Different combinations of the im-
portance factor R and scale of fluctuation (d) are used. The case with R = 0.8 and d = 200m is represen-
tative for piping in typical Dutch ground conditions, see Lopez de la Cruz et. al (2010). It shows the 
length-effect factor can be larger than 100 in extreme cases. The other combinations of R and d illustrate 
the sensitivity of the length effect. 
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Figure 13. Length-effect factor of piping ring for different examples 
5 FROM TARGET RELIABILITY TO PARTIAL SAFETY FACTORS 
So far, we treated acceptable risk and made and inventory of what needs to be accounted for in terms of 
failure mechanisms and length-effect. This section shows how partial safety factors in design and assess-
ment rules can be deduced from high-level requirements like acceptable probabilities of failure on system 
level. 
5.1 System Definition 
In section 2, the issue of acceptable flood risk was discussed without specifying the geographic extent or 
system that should be contemplated, when analyzing the likelihood and consequences of flooding. Purely 
in a theoretical sense, one would choose an independent system, for example a whole river basin, where 
there is no interaction with flood risk measures outside the chosen boundaries (Schweckendiek et. al, 
2008). From a practical point of view, one rather works on a smaller scale. Hydraulic structures and dike 
sections with a similar flood pattern in case of failure and, therefore, similar consequences can be 
grouped and defined as the system to work with. N.B. legal aspects frequently impose boundary condi-
tions, too, for example where flood defenses cross national or state boundaries. Regarding the acceptance 
criteria, the economical optimization only involves the risk contribution of a chosen (sub)system, while 
the criteria for social acceptability still need to be applied on the scale they were derived for. That means 
that for the location-specific individual risk one needs to consider the contributions of all sub-systems to 
the probability of dying in a certain spot. For group risk usually even all contributions on national or state 
scale need to be considered. 
 
 
Figure 14. Fictitious Dike Ring in The Netherlands 
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For sake of illustration, in the remainder of this section, we will consider a fictitious example from the 
Netherlands. A so-called dike ring (polder surrounded by flood defenses and/or high grounds) exhibits 
very similar consequences regardless of the location of the failing dike or hydraulic structure. In fact, this 
is rather realistic for low-lying delta areas. 
5.2 Sub-System Requirements 
This section deals with the requirements in terms of reliability; their derivation from risk is out of the 
scope of this paper. The highest level requirement is the acceptable probability of failure of the (sub )sys-
tem: Pf,adm,sys . 
5.3 Dikes and Hydraulic Structures 
The first step is to distribute the acceptable probability of failure over the structures in the dike ring: 
Pf,adm,sys = Pf,adm,dike +  Pf,adm,other,i (18) 
where Pf,adm,dike is the acceptable probability of failure of any dike section in the system and Pf,adm,other,i is 
the acceptable probability of failure of any other structure in the system. Since the geotechnical aspects 
are of most interest here, the remainder of this section is restricted to the dikes.  
Note that implicitly the assumption was made that the probabilities of failure of the elements are inde-
pendent. In reality, there is often a positive correlation mainly due to the rather large spatial correlation of 
the loads. For example, long dike reaches in riverine areas experience very similar loadings, in coastal ar-
eas similar wave conditions. This assumption is conservative, which seems reasonable in this standardiza-
tion procedure. 
5.4 Failure Mechanisms 
The second step is to establish acceptable probabilities of failure per mechanism Pf,adm,dike,mech,i : 
Pf,adm,dike =  Pf,adm,dike,mech,i  = Pf,adm,dike,over + Pf,adm,dike,inst + Pf,adm,dike,pip + …  (19) 
where Pf,adm,dike,over  is the acceptable probability of failure due to overtopping, Pf,adm,dike,inst due to instabil-
ity of the inner slope and Pf,adm,dike,pip  due to piping etc.. 
In principle, the Pf,adm,dike,mech,i can be chosen in an economically optimal way. Mechanisms, for which 
high reliability target are inexpensive to realize should “occupy” less of the acceptable probability than 
mechanisms requiring relatively costly safety measures. In the Netherlands, such (historically rather 
qualitative) considerations suggest a (target) distribution as summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Pf,adm,dike over mechanisms ______________________________________________ 
Failure mechanism  = Pf,adm,dike,mech,i  / Pf,adm,dike ___________________________________________ 
Overtopping 90% 
Piping 3% 
Instability 3% 
Other ~1% _____________________________________________ 
 
Note that in the considerations regarding efficient distributions also interaction between design parame-
ters for different failure mechanisms plays a role. For example, a dike that needs to be high for overtop-
ping and that has a gentle slopes for slope stability automatically has quite some seepage length, which is 
the main resistance parameter for piping. Also, in deriving new standards, the current conditions of the 
flood defense system under consideration (i.e., starting point) have an influence on what is optimal. 
5.5 Dike Sections (Accounting for the Length-Effect) 
Pf,adm,dike,mech,i  is the acceptable probability of failure per mechanism for all the dike sections in the 
(sub)system. However, designs and safety assessments are usually made for dike sections a few hundred 
meters or several kilometers long, with rather homogeneous properties (both, loading and resistance). As 
discussed in section 4, the length-effect plays an important role in this step. The essence is that the longer 
the dike with respect to the scale of fluctuation, most importantly of the resistance, the higher the prob-
ability of failure. For deriving requirements this implies that the acceptable probability of failure per 
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mechanism for a dike section (or a cross section that is representative for a dike section) Pf,adm,ds,mech,i 
needs to be smaller than for all dikes in the considered reach: 
Pf,adm,ds,mech,i  = Pf,adm,dike,mech / nmech (20) 
The length-effect factor nmech is typically about 2 to 10 for load-dominated mechanisms like overtopping, 
and can be in the order of magnitude of 100 for resistance dominated mechanisms like piping. 
5.6 Partial Safety Factors 
Pf,adm,ds,mech,i  is the (low-level) target reliability req, to which design and safety assessment rules apply 
and for which partial safety factors are derived. 
req,mech = -(Pf,adm,ds,mech,i) (21) 
A common approach is to use level-I reliability theory with standardized importance factors (Table 3). 
For a lognormal-distributed resistance variable, the partial safety factor is determined by: 
    2exp 1.65 ln 1R R V      R  (22) 
where V /R R R  ,   is the target reliability index and R  is the importance factor of the resistance. 
 
Table 3. Standardized Importance Factors for LRFD ______________________________________________ 
Parameter  ___________________________________________ 
dominant load parameter 0.80 
other load parameters 0.28 
dominant strength parameter 0.70 
other strength parameters 0.32 _____________________________________________ 
 
Figure 15 shows the dependence of the partial resistance factor of the target reliability index, the impor-
tance factor and the uncertainty in the (overall) resistance (here expressed in terms of the coefficient of 
variation VR) with typical values for a resistance dominated failure mechanism like piping. 
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Figure 15. Relation of Partial resistance Factor and Target Reliability Index 
Recently, Lopez de la Cruz et. al (2011) reported on a code calibration exercise for the failure mechanism 
piping in the Netherlands where a slightly different, more detailed approach was adopted. Instead of using 
standardized importance factors, the authors analyzed the performance for different values of the partial 
resistance factor in terms of resulting reliability indices. Furthermore, they established a reliability-
dependent partial safety factor (see Figure 16) that can be used flexibly depending on the target reliability 
in a given area or (sub-system). 
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Figure 16. Partial Resistance Factor p vs. Reliability Index  for Piping according to Lopez de la Cruz et. al (2011) 
5.7 Overview / Example 
Figure 17 gives an overview of the steps described above for the different mechanisms, including a realis-
tic numerical example. Note that, so far, only the treatment of resistance uncertainties has been treated. 
For the definition of design loads often an exceedance probability of the load combination is defined by: 
F = P(S>SD) = (1-Sreq)) (23) 
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Figure 17. Overview of the Steps from high-level to low-level Requirements with a numerical example 
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Note that the difference between target the acceptable probability of failure on system and on mechanism 
level for a cross section can easily be a factor 1000 depending on the way it is dealt with different mecha-
nisms and length effects. 
5.8 Alternative approaches 
The approach described so far is based on pragmatic choices. It is emphasized that there are numerous al-
ternatives to the approach and also within the described framework. On example is to change the order of 
the distribution of the admissible probability of failure: go from system level to structures and dike sec-
tions first, then to the mechanisms. There are advantages and disadvantages that have mainly to do with 
the envisaged use of the rules in practice. 
Furthermore, there are many possibilities for optimization. For example, correlations between mecha-
nisms or structures can be taken into account in deriving the specific requirements from the high-level re-
quirements. 
Another obvious opportunity for improvement with large impact potential is the application of reliabil-
ity analysis or reliability-based design (RBD), which can reduce the implicit conservatism in level-I ap-
proaches by better accounting for the uncertainties in specific conditions. 
6 DISCUSSION 
This paper attempts to demonstrate how tailor-made safety standards for large scale flood defense sys-
tems can be derived in a risk-based fashion. Since flood defenses differ from smaller scale geotechnical 
structures in many aspects and given the volume of investments in such large-scale engineering systems, 
it is very attractive to deviate from the standard design codes. That is not deviating conceptually, but 
rather   deriving safety factors for the specific application to better account for the characteristics and un-
certainties involved. The authors strive to show that safety levels and partial safety factors in the pre-
sented approach are far from arbitrary. They are part of an overall consistent flood risk framework, a 
framework that provides a link between geotechnical engineers and other disciplines involved in provid-
ing safety from flooding.  
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